Abstract There are demands for secure group communication on the internet, such as pay-per-view type broadcasting, business confidential information sharing and teleconference. Secure communication inside a groups on an open network is critical to enhance the internet capability. The public key system is not sufficient to support the group security, since it is not scalable for large groups. Some researchers propose a scalable group security model, managing several common keys for encryption and decryption sharing inside the community. In this paper, we will evaluate the performance of these group security model. Using M/G/∞ queueing models and the basic queueing theory, we show how to find the optimal condition of the allocation of the common keys if the joins to group is a Poisson process. In addition, we show our optimal condition may work for more general arrival processes by using the cross covariance formula (a variant of Papangelou's formula) for the stochastic intensity of departure process.
not be scalable. For example, consider an internet broadcasting company which has 10,000 subscribers. The server has to encrypt the data 10,000 times with different keys. Thus, it is impossible for streaming type real-time applications like Pay TV or teleconference.
One of the solutions to this problem is to share a common symmetric group key among the group, and use it when sending information [6] [5] . Using the group key, the sender can reduce the number of encryptions to one per data in the group. The group key might be sent to the participants of the group by using the one-to-one secure communication in advance. This group key model also has a problem to be solved. Since groups might be instable, some of the participants will leave and join the group in the future. If one participants left the group, we cannot use the same group key to keep the security of the communication. For example, a subscriber of Pay TV on the internet will quit watching the program when he/she feels it is not worth watching. If we keep using the same group key after the leave, some malicious subscriber will quit watching but keep watching the program using the group key in his/her hand. So, when the participants change in the group, we need to renew the old group key. Now, every time if one participant leaves a group of 10,000 participants, we have to encrypt the new group key 10,000 times to send them to each participants. Clearly, this model is not scalable.
In Wong [15] and RFC2627 [13] , the authors introduce a concept of subgroup in the secure group communication to solve the above problem. They showed that using additional subgroup keys, they can decrease the number of encryptions of the group key, dramatically. The subgroup keys are exclusively shared in its subgroup, and used to encrypt a new group key.
In this paper, we use basic queueing theory to evaluate the number of encryptions in the subgroup model and show the optimal number of subgroups for Poisson arrivals. In addition, we show our optimal condition may work for more general arrival processes by using covariance formula for the stochastic intensity of departure process.
Secure Group Communication
Here we briefly summarize the idea of secure group communication. In the following, we write (A) b , when data A is encrypted by a key b. For simplicity, suppose we have a group of 15 subscribers, U 1 , ..., U 15 , and we have a key server which manages to issue group and subgroup keys.
A participant U i has its own public key O i and secret key S i (or symmetric key if both sides has already negotiated). The key server initially generate a group key G(0). The group key G(0) is encrypted by O i , and (G(0)) O i is sent to U i on an open network. Each user uses his own secret (or symmetric) key to decrypt G(0). Thus, participants can send the information encrypted by G(0) to share them inside the group. Now let us consider a scenario;
1. First, U 15 leaves the group. 2. Then, a new participant U 16 joins the group.
As pointed out in the previous section, when the participants changed, we need to renew the group key and send them to each participants with encryption. We will estimate the number of encryptions of new group keys. First, we will consider the case when there is no subgroup, and then we will evaluate the case with subgroups. 
Without subgroups
Next, we should consider to send the new group key G(1) to the members of the subgroup SG 3 . U 15 knows the old subgroup key SG 3 (0), so it is not appropriate to send G(1) encrypted by SG 3 (0). First, we generate a new subgroup key SG 3 (1), and send SG 3 (1) encrypted by each member's public key. Thus we need the following 4 encryptions to the members of SG 3 .
Then, using this new subgroup key SG 3 (1), we can encrypt the new group key G(1) as
Thus, summing up (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6), we can get the total number of encryptions required for the leave of U 15 ,
(2.7)
Compare to (2.2), the number of encryptions is decreasing when we introduce the concept of subgroup. Now let us suppose U 16 joins the group. Assume the new participant U 16 will join to the subgroup SG 3 . As in the previous section, since we can reuse the old group key G(1), we have
Thus, only 2 encryptions are required to renew the group key. However, since we need to send the new subgroup key SG 3 (2) to the members of SG 3 , we need 2 more encryptions:
Together with (2.8) and (2.9), we need
for sending the new keys to each participants when U 16 joins the group. Note that compare to (2.3), the number of encryptions is increased because of the additional subgroup keys.
Encryptions and subgroups
We summarize the results of our example in Table 1 . We can find the total number of encryptions decreases, but the number of encryptions at the join increases, due to the additional subgroup keys. If we use subgroups, we can reduce the number of encryptions of the group key, but at the same time the number of encryptions to send the subgroup keys is increased. Thus, to see the effect of the subgroups, we need to take into account the number of participants and the number of subgroups. To do this, we need to establish a queueing model. By using the queueing theory, we will see how to estimate the number of encryptions in the next section.
Queueing Model
We make a queueing model to deal with the secure group communication. Note that the subgroup keys are used only for the delivery of the group key, but not for the communication inside the group. Thus, we assume the subgroup can be made independent of the member's attribute. Of course, we can use the subgroup keys for the communication inside the subgroup, if the members of the subgroup shares some special interest (e.g. a company is a group and a department is its subgroup). However, in the following, we assume the subgroup is purely for the delivery of the group keys.
Let U n be the n-th participant of the group, T n be the join (arrival) time of the U n , and S n be the sojourn time of U n in the group. We assume the point process of the new participant's join is Poisson process with rate λ. Also, assume the sojourn time S n has independent and identical distribution F (x) = P [S n ≤ x] with its mean E[S n ] = 1/µ. There is no limit of the number of participants in the group. Section 5) .
We divide the group into N subgroups, (SG i ) i=1,...N . Let L i (t) be the number of members of subgroup SG i , and L(t) be the number of the participants to the group at time t.
When a new participant joins the group, the participants will be assigned to a subgroup with equal probability independent of any other event (Bernouilli trial). Thus, let J n be the index of the new participant U n , then we have
It is well-known that if we divide the Poisson process with Bernouilli trial, each stream is also independent Poisson process ([11] P.69). Thus, the arrivals to each subgroup can be regarded as the independent Poisson process with rate λ/N, and L i (t) is the number of customers at time t of the M/G/∞ queue with its service time distribution F (x) (for example, see [8] ). The customers of this queueing system receive service immediately at the arrival and leave the system when the service is finished.
In the equilibrium state, the steady state distribution of the number of members L i (t) of the M/G/∞ queue at arbitrary time is the Poisson distribution with mean λ/(µN) [8] .
Since the arrival rate to the subgroup SG i is λ/N, we have
Since the arrival stream to each subgroup is independent, {L i (t)} i=1,...,N has independent and identical Poisson distribution. The mean number of members in a subgroup is obtained by
and the mean number of participants to whole group is obtained by
The Number of Encryptions
We use the queueing model M/G/∞ to estimate the number of encryptions. Let G(t) be the group key and (SG 1 (t), ..., SG N (t)) be the subgroup keys at time t. In the following, we assume the functions G(t) and SG i (t) are right-continuous. Note that G(t) has jumps at arrivals {T n } and departures {D n = T n + S n }. Also, the function SG i (t) has jump at the arrival and departure of the subgroup.
Leaving the group
Let us consider the case when a participant U n leaves the group at the time D n . Since U n has been a member of SG Jn , two keys, the group key G(D n −) and subgroup key SG Jn (D n −), should be renewed. However, unlike the joining case shown in Section 4.2, U n knows G(D n −) and SG Jn (D n −). So, we should follow the procedure below to renew the two keys.
1. The key server generates a new group key G(D n ) and a new subgroup key SG Jn (D n ). 2. The key server encrypts the new subgroup key with the public key O k of each member in the subgroup SG Jn ,
and send them to each member who remains in the subgroup SG Jn immediately after the time D n . Here, k is the index of members of SG Jn at D n +. 3. The key server can use the subgroup keys to encrypt the new group key G(D n ),
and send them to the each participants.
Letting A n be the number of encryptions required for the leave of U n , we have
where L Jn (D n +) is the number of members of SG Jn immediately after the leave of U n * . In general, if we have M layers and N m subgroups in the m-th layer, we have
Joining the group
Let us assume a new participant U n joins the group at the time T n . Since U n joins a subgroup SG Jn , the group key G(T n −) and the subgroup key SG Jn (T n −) should be renewed at the time T n . Under the assumption that U n does not know two key G(T n −) and SG Jn (T n −), we can renew them according to the following procedure.
1. The key server generates a new group key G(T n ) and a new subgroup key SG Jn (T n ). 2. The key server encrypts the new group key with the old group key,
and send it to the L(T n −) participants who are already in the group just before the arrival of U n . 3. The key server encrypts the new subgroup key with the old subgroup key,
and send it to the L i (T n −) members who are already in the subgroup just before the arrival of U n . * When a customer leaves a subgroup and the subgroup becomes empty, we do not need to encrypt a new group key with the subgroup key. However, for simplicity, we assume that the group key is encrypted with the subgroup key even in such cases.
4. The key server use the public key of U n to encrypt as
and send it to U n . Let B n be the number of encryptions at the join of U n . Then, we have
which is independent of the number of subgroups and members.
In general, if we make more layers of sub-subgroups inside a subgroup, we have
where M is the number of layers.
Optimal number of subgroups
Now we consider a problem to find the optimal number of subgroups, which minimizes the mean number of encryptions. From (4.3) and (4.1), we can see the number of encryptions depends on the number of subgroups and the number of members to each subgroups. Especially, the number of encryptions at the join is constant, so it is sufficient to estimate the one for the leave to get the optimal number of subgroups. Thus, we will find the number of subgroups N min , which minimizes the mean number of encryptions at the n-th leave, E[A n ]. Note that A n is the burst workload and critical performance index for the key server.
From (4.1), the expectation of A n can be obtained by
It is well-known in the queueing theory that if a system allows only discontinuous changes of size (plus or minus) one at the arrival and departure, then the probability distribution of the number of customers in the system seen by the arrivals is equal to the one left behind by departure (see [8] , P176). Thus, 
also Poisson distribution and its mean is obtained by λ/(Nµ). Hence, we have
By a simple calculation, we can minimize E[A n ] when N = (λ/µ) 1/2 . So, the optimal number of subgroups can be obtained by
Thus, the optimal number of the subgroups is the square root of the expected number of the participant to the whole group. In addition, from (4.1) and the fact that P [L Jn (D n +) = k] is also Poisson distribution, we can obtain the distribution of the number of encryptions by
. Also, the mean optimal number of encryptions is Here in Figure 1 , we compare the no-subgroup model and the optimal subgroup model. We can see the clear advantage of the subgroup model in terms of the number of encryptions.
Since the mean number C of encryptions in a unit interval is given by
we have the optimal mean number of encryptions in a unit time C min as
Finally, consider the group has M layers of subgroups. Let N min i be the optimal number of subgroups in i-th layer. We can easily obtain the optimal number,
Remark 4.1 In general, the encryption workload using public keys is longer than the one using secret keys. Set the encryption time using secret key to be a unit time, and the encryption time using public key to be α. Then, as similar to (4.8) , we have
where W n is the workload required for the encryptions at the leave. Thus, the optimal number of subgroups to minimize the total workload can be obtained by
General Arrival Processes
In the previous sections, we obtained the optimal number of subgroups assuming Poisson arrival of users. In this section, we discuss the possibility of extension of our result to more general arrival processes. Since
, and the subgroup to be joined is determined independently to anything else, we have
Thus, for general arrivals, the optimal condition (4.9) can be replaced by
Hence, to show that (4.9) still works for general arrivals, we need to estimate the difference between the event average E[L(D n +)] and the time average E[L(t)] for general arrival processes. More precisely, let A min be the number of encryptions for the optimal case
1/2 , and let A P be the number of encryptions when we set N = E[L(t)] 1/2 . We will show the relative difference between A min and A P can be small for the large group, i.e.,
Now, recall the definition of the (conditional) stochastic intensity of point processes [9] . Let T n be the time of n-th join and A(t) be the number of joins in (0, t], then the stochastic intensity of A(t) given L(t) is defined by
Intuitively, λ(t) is the stochastic intensity conditioned by the number of users in the group just before arrivals. Note that the ordinary stochastic intensity is defined to be conditioned by the history of system up to t, F t = σ(L(s−), A(s); s ≤ t) [1] , but the above definition is sufficient for our purpose. By using the heuristic argument similar to [7] , for a small s
Letting s → 0 on both sides, we have 6) where
] is the intensity of A(t). The equation (5.6) is known to be Papangelou's formula [1, 7] . Using (5.6), we can obtain the so-called cross-covariance equation [9, 10] ;
Note that (5.7) holds for all processes which has the stochastic intensity. Now, we consider the reverse process. Let D(t) be the left-continuous counting process of leaves, i.e. the number of leaves during [0, t). By reversing the sample path of process L(t), the leaves of original process are considered to be joins to the reversed process. Define the reversed stochastic intensity
Intuitively, λ D (t) can be regarded as the stochastic intensity conditioned by the number of users left behind at the leave. Then by using (5.7) for this reversed process, we have
Then, by using (5.9), we can rewrite (5.4) as [3, 4, 7, 9, 10] .
Numerical Example
Let us consider the pay TV on the internet for an example. Suppose we can expect the mean number of the participants is 10, 000. Assume each participants will remain the group 30 minutes on the average. Thus, we have µ = 1/30, λ = µE[L] = 1000/3 for the M/G/∞ queue. By (4.9), we can estimate the optimal number of subgroups,
As described in the previous section, the expected number of encryptions at the leave E[A We summarize the result of the optimal case and compare it with the cases of the nonoptimal number of subgroups in Table 2 . As you see in Table 2 , for the large group such as the multicast group of the size 10, 000, the number of the subgroup has the great significance in terms of the performance of the key server.
Next, we will show the advantage of our optimal solution in the sense of distribution of the number of encryptions as well as its mean. Since the number of encryptions for nonoptimal cases is also Poisson distribution as discussed in Section 4.3, we can compare the distribution among the different number of subgroups. In Figure 2 , we show the distribution of optimal solution and non-optimal cases. Of course, there is a chance to have a large number of encryptions in the optimal case, but as you can see in the Figure 2 the large number of encryption happens less likely compared to the non-optimal cases.
Conclusion
Introducing the subgroup concept into the group communication such as Pay TV, we can make a scalable secure group communication. Further, we showed that the number of subgroups should be the square root of the expected number of participants, since it minimizes the number of encryptions at the key server.
Dynamic control of the subgroup and the efficient subgrouping considering network topology might be the future work. 
